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Linking the Public Benefit to the
Corporation:
Blockchain as a Solution for
Certification in an Age of "Do-Good"
Business
ABSTRACT

As part of its now-infamous emissions scandal, Volkswagen
spent tens of millions of dollars on advertising geared toward
environmentally conscious consumers. The scandal is an example of
"greenwashing," which, along with the corresponding term
"fairwashing," represents the information asymmetry present in
product markets that involve claims of social and environmental
responsibility in companies' production practices. As consumers and
investors demand responsible production practices from both
traditional corporations and entities organized under the newer
corporateform known as public benefit corporations(PBCs), it becomes
even more important to verify that those entities' supply chains are, in
fact, meeting standards for the social or environmental responsibility
Blockchain technology is a
that they purport or strive to have.
promising tool for providing the level of accountability that has become
As an electronic,
necessary in the modern business world.
decentralized ledger, it could provide an effective disclosure method for
the purpose of certifying that businesses' supply chains comply with
standards for social and environmental responsibility. This Note
argues that blockchain's inherent transparency fosters the accuracy in
certification needed to create prosocial, procompetitive effects in the
growing market for companies with sustainable business practices.
These effects should outweigh potential antitrust concerns that could
give rise to legal challenges against a uniformly adopted system of
blockchain-based certification methods.
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In 2016, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) secured $10
billion in the "largest false advertising case in FTC history" through a
settlement with Volkswagen (VW). 1 In one of the most infamous
modern instances of fraud, VW implanted a device in its vehicles to
trick emissions tests, thereby selling cars that not only polluted up to
forty times the amount of nitrogen oxide permissible under US
regulationS 2 but also violated regulatory schemes of governments
around the world.3 According to the FTC's complaint in the US

1.

Volkswagen

2.OL

Settlement,

FED.

TRADE

COMM'N

(Oct.

2016),

https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/refunds/volkswagen-settlement

[https://perma.cc/8NVM-KGJ3].
2.
Russell Hotten, Volkswagen: The Scandal Explained, BBC NEWS (Dec. 10, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-34324772 [https://perma.cc/7LVL-U6PT].
3.
Jess McHugh, Volkswagen Diesel Scandal Update 2015: Affected Countries Are
Largely in North America, Europe, but Asia Not Immune [MAP], INT'L BUS. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2015,
12:30 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/volkswagen-diesel-scandal-update-2015-affected-countriesare-largely-north-america-2137284 [https://perma.cc/3RSW-L5KE]; Reuters, EU Finds That VW
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District Court for the Northern District of California, VW "spent tens
of millions of dollars" on advertising that "targeted . . . 'progressive'
and
'environmentally-conscious'
consumers"
by
"stud[ying]
their .

.

. psychology[ and] concluding that such consumers 'rationalize

themselves out of their aspirations and justify buying lesser cars
under the guise of being responsible."' 4 The complaint described
numerous advertising efforts focusing on the theme of consumer
environmental conscientiousness, 5 such as a 2008 television
advertisement entitled "Do Your Part"'6 :
[The ad] depicts people commuting in different environmentally friendly ways:
"trying to do their part" by taking the bus, riding a Segway, biking, and driving a
car with the bumper sticker "powered by vegetable oil." Then an Audi A3 speeds
by, and the announcer observes: "Some just have more fun doing it." The screen
reads: "42mpg. 30% fewer emissions." The ad ends with the tagline: "Diesel. It's
7
no longer a dirty word."

By installing the emissions test-defying device in its cars, VW
not only purposely deceived governmental inspectors into believing
that the vehicles complied with relevant regulations and laws but also
violated the representations made to consumers through an aggressive
and concerted advertising effort. 8 Moreover, in addition to violating
consumer confidence and government requirements, the scandal
betrayed VW shareholders' expectations that the company managers
would act in good faith to maximize share value. 9 The shareholders
have filed claims for damages totaling around $9.2 billion. 10 VW's
Broke Consumer Laws in 20 Countries, Report Says, FORTUNE (Sept. 5, 2016),
http://fortune.com/2016/09/05/eu-volkswagen-emissions-tests/ [https://perma.cc/6NEJ-85HE].
4.
Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief TT 22-23, FTC v.
Cal. Mar. 29, 2016)
(N.D.
3:16-cv-01534
Grp. of Am., Inc., No.
Volkswagen
(quoting "Volkswagen USA's Marketers"), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/
160329volkswagen-cmpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PYA-CQEF].
See id. ¶ 26.B-J.
5.
Id. ¶ 26.A.
6.
Id.
7.
8.
E.J. Schultz, FTC Charges Volkswagen with Deceptive Advertising, ADAGE (Mar. 29,
http://adage.com/article/cmo-strategy/ftc-charges-volkswagen-deceptive-advertising/
2016),
303306/ [https://perma.ce/5U2K-ZFJN]; see, e.g., Guilbert Gates et al., How Volkswagen's 'Defeat
Devices' Worked, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/
business/international/vw-diesel-emissions-scandal-explained.html.
Peter Campbell, Volkswagen's Market Share Falls After Scandal: Sales Performance
9.
in the First Half of 2016 Lags Behind Rivals, FIN. TIMES (July 15, 2016),
[https://perma.cc/3MY6https://www.ft.com/content/35575f80-4a75-1 1e6-b387-64ab0a67014c
T52D]; Paul R. La Monica, Volkswagen Has Plunged 50%. Will It Ever Recover?, CNN MONEY
(Sept. 25, 2015, 1:06 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/09/24/investing/volkswagen-vw-emissionsscandal-stock/ [https://perma.cc/9GZD-TE3Z].
Nicola Clark, Volkswagen Shareholders Seek $9.2 Billion over Diesel Scandal, N.Y.
10.
TIMES (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/22/business/international/volkswagenvw-investors-lawsuit-germany.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/97RD-XH2R];
see also Reuters,

884

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 20:3:881

effort to represent its product as a car for the environmentally
conscious is perhaps the most notorious modern example of
"greenwashing"-the act of plastering a product with an undeserved
eco-friendly label."
With the prominent role and high impact of corporations on
society and the environment, modern consumers demand more
accountability for corporate practices and business choices than
Scholars and
traditional corporate doctrine strictly requires. 12
observers of corporate law and business ethics have noted this shift
and debate the extent to which traditional corporate law allows
businesses to pursue some expanded corporate purpose beyond
traditional profit maximization. 13 Meanwhile, traditional corporations
are voluntarily imposing environmentally and socially responsible
standards on themselves and their supply chains. 14 Businesses with
Volkswagen Faces Shareholder Claims over Emissions Scandal, CNBC (Jan. 18, 2016, 11:19
http://www.cnbc.com/2016/01/18/volkswagen-faces-shareholder-claims-over-emissionsPM),
scandal.html [https://perma.cc/D4GS-SZ7B] ("Dozens of large shareholders in Volkswagen plan
to sue the carmaker in a German court, seeking compensation for the plunge in its shares due to
its emissions test cheating scandal.").
11.
See Tracey M. Roberts, The Rise of Rule Four Institutions: Voluntary Standards,
Certificationand Labeling Systems, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 107, 147 (2013).
See discussion infra Part I.A.
12.
13.
JOSEPH HEATH, MORALITY, COMPETITION, AND THE FIRM: THE MARKET FAILURES
APPROACH TO BUSINESS ETHICS 25--26 (2014) ("Profit-maximization and self-interest are not the

same thing, and the failure to distinguish adequately between the two can be a source of
enormous confusion. . . . [B]usiness ethics is best understood as a set of additional constraints
that preclude legally permissible, but not normatively justifiable, profit-maximizing strategies.");
LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: How PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS
INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 2-4 (2012); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A

Team ProductionTheory of CorporateLaw, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 253 (1999) ("The team production
model provides an alternative answer to the question of why corporate law grants directors of
public corporations so much leeway. . . . Because this view challenges the shareholder primacy
norm that has come to dominate the theoretical literature, our analysis appears to parallel many
of the arguments raised in recent years by the 'communitarian' or 'progressive' school of
corporate scholars who believe that corporate law ought to require directors to serve not only the
shareholders' interests, but also those of employees, consumers, creditors, and other corporate
'stakeholders."'); Gabriel Rauterberg, The Corporation'sPlace in Society, 114 MICH. L. REV. 913,
914 (2016).
14.

See, e.g., Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL

L. REV. 129, 157 (2013) ("Wal-Mart, meanwhile, imposes energy efficiency requirements on its
suppliers. .. [I]t demands less energy use, which typically correlates with lower emissions of
greenhouse gases and other air pollutants. The motivations are complex, but the important
aspect of the supply chain contracting in this case is that it serves an environmental protection
function (e.g., reducing air pollution) that Wal-Mart has no public law obligation to address in its
supply chain contracts."); see also Steve New, The Transparent Supply Chain, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Oct. 2010), https://hbr.org/2010/10/the-transparent-supply-chain [https://perma.cclUAW6-H7C7]
(providing Wal-Mart, Tesco, and Kroger as examples of firms that have started to increase
transparency about their supply chains); Andrew Ross Sorkin, Apple's Tim Cook Barnstorms for
'Moral
Responsibility,
N.Y.
TIMES:
DEALBOOK
(Aug.
28,
2017),

2018]

LINKING THE PUBLIC BENEFIT TO THE CORPORATION

885

socially and environmentally responsible practices draw increasing
consumer demand and investment value, 15 and similar prominence is
growing for the public benefit corporation (PBC)16 -a "new type of
business structure that empowers the corporation's leadership to
balance public benefits against shareholder profits."1 7 In contrast to
the traditional corporate model, in which maximizing value for
shareholders is the primary goal of the company,18 "directors in a
[PBC] are required to balance shareholders' interests, the public's
interest and the interests of other stakeholders (such as employees)."1 9
Therefore, the very purpose of the PBC corporate form is to require
that the companies implement practices advancing a public benefit,

&

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/28/business/dealbook/tim-cook-apple-moral-responsibility.html
[https://perma.cc/Z3F2-AJSN] ("The reality is that government, for a long period of time, has for
whatever set of reasons become less functional and isn't working at the speed that it once was.
And so it does fall, I think, not just on business but on all other areas of society to step up.' That
was Tim Cook, Apple's chief excutive . . . ."). But see Karen Bradshaw Schulz, New Governance
and Industry Culture, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2515, 2517-18, 2519 (2013) ("Sustainability
certifications [in the forestry industry] emerged not as private self-regulation by an industry, but
instead as a public-private partnership, in which state agency employees and industry actors
worked together to enforce standards. . .. Private forms of social regulation working in tandem
with government institutions are rapidly supplanting older, state-centric models of market
regulation. New governance focuses upon non-state actors governing their own behavior based on
self-generated norms and rules, with decreased reliance [sic] state enforcement powers.").
See discussion infra Part I.A.
15.
See discussion infra Part I.A.
16.
17.
CT Corp. Staff, Benefit Corporations: FAQs, WOLTERS KLUWER (Jan. 7, 2016),
https://ct.wolterskluwer.com/resource-center/articles/benefit-corporations-faqs
[https://perma.cc/39A5-245A].
See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); see also David J.
18.
Berger, In Search of Lost Time: What If Delaware Had Not Adopted Shareholder Primacy? 3
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
manuscript),
(unpublished
2017)
15,
(Feb.
papers.cfm?abstractjid=2916960 [https://perma.cc/C2KD-LBLW] ("Since at least the mid-1980s
we have lived in a world of shareholder primacy. In this world the primary duty of directors is to
maximize the value of the corporation for the benefit of the stockholders. Directors who reject
this notion, who take actions that are for the primary benefit of other so-called 'stakeholders' in
the corporation-be they employees, customers, the communities served by the corporation or
others-have their ideas rejected in the boardroom, may be the subject of scorn and derision in
the business press and with their peers, can be voted out of their positions by shareholders and
even be found to have breached their fiduciary duty to the company and its shareholders."
(footnote omitted)); Michael B. Dorff, Why Public Benefit Corporations?, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG
(Nov. 28, 2016), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/11/28/why-public-benefit-corporations/
[https://perma.cc/7A5C-GV9Q] ("Delaware corporate law holds as a core precept that the
corporation's goal is to maximize shareholder value."). But see STOUT, supra note 13, at 3; Blair
Stout, supra note 13, at 254 (proposing a "mediating hierarchy" approach to corporate law).
19.
CT Corp. Staff, supra note 17; see also FAQ: General Questions, BENEFIT CORP.,
http://benefitcorp.net/faq [https://perma.ccfLPG9-LG6D] (last visited Dec. 21, 2017); Legal FAQS,
BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/documents/Implications-of Becoming
aDEPublicBenefitCorporation_0.pdf [https://perma.cclM5XN-W5FY] (last visited Dec. 21,
2017).
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making it crucial that those practices be effectively verified as such.
The more market power companies stand to gain from reputations for
socially or environmentally responsible production practices, the more
important it becomes to verify the accuracy of those reputations-as
VW customers and shareholders would likely confirm.
Meanwhile, innovators have repurposed blockchain technology
from its famous use underlying the Bitcoin cryptocurrency to track
production along corporate supply chains to ensure that the
conscientious business practices being reported and advertised are
truly taking place. 20 As an independently verifiable and decentralized
ledger, blockchain technology could play an important role in the
changing corporate environment by providing enhanced transparency
in the certification systems used to verify compliance with standards.
This Note argues that as the market value of responsible
production-both by traditional corporations and PBCs-grows, it
more necessary to verify purported socially and
becomes
Blockchain represents a
environmentally responsible practices.
promising tool to provide such accountability in enforcing standards
for certification and labeling systems. Part I describes the economic
market in which socially responsible products and PBCs rose to
prominence; the nature of the PBC corporate form; the role of
standards, certifications, and labeling systems in addressing market
failures and gaps in the legal regime; and background information
about blockchain technology. Next, Part II analyzes the practical and
legal problems that arise in the process of enforcing standards-both
in the traditional corporate context and in the emerging realm of
PBCs. Additionally, it describes the heightened need for uniformity in
standard setting, particularly in the PBC context, and argues that
antitrust enforcement of a uniform, blockchain-based certification
system should be done sparingly in order to foster the procompetitive
effects of such a system. Finally, Part III proposes a path forward for
harnessing this technology, and Part IV concludes.

20.

See infra Part III.
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I. BACKGROUND

A. The Growing Market for Social and Environmental Sustainability
and the PBC
Market demand for products made through responsible
production processes grew substantially in the past few decades. 21
Consumers place great value on sustainability, so much so that an
entire sustainability market recently emerged, even during a period of
economic downturn. 22 For example, in 2011, the year of lowest
production for the construction industry during the economic
recession, 23 "construction of eco-friendly single-family homes
represented an impressive 17 percent . . . of the overall American

residential construction market," in contrast to its claim of 2 percent
of the market in 2005 and 8 percent in 2008.24 "[T]he number is
expected to rise to as high as 38 percent within the next four years
and represent a market share of $87 billion to $114 billion." 25 In
addition, the popularity of "fair trade" products gained prominence in
the early 2010s, even as those products commanded higher prices
when christened with the fair trade label.2 6

Demand for corporate social responsibility exists not just in the
consumer market but also in the investment market. BlackRock is a
21.
See Tensie Whelan & Carly Fink, The Comprehensive Business Case for
Sustainability, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 21, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/10/the-comprehensivebusiness-case-for-sustainability [https://perma.cc/TT7Z-8K4S].
22.
See id.
Real Value Added by Private Industries: Construction, FRED: ECON. RES.,
23.
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/RVAC [https://perma.cc/EM2E-U3BW] (last visited Dec. 21,
2017).
24.
Matt Hickman, Study: Demand for Green Home Building and Remodeling on the
Rise, MOTHER NATURE NETWORK (Feb. 13, 2012, 7:29 PM), http://www.mnn.com/your-home/athome/blogs/study-demand-for-green-home-building-and-remodeling-on-the-rise
[https://perma.cclPAW7-Z9GZ], quoted in Roberts, supra note 11, at 150 n.255.
Id.
25.
See Rebecca Smithers, Global FairtradeSales Reach £4.4bn Following 15% Growth
26.
During 2013, GUARDIAN (Sept. 3, 2014, 11:23 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopment/2014/sep/03/global-fair-trade-sales-reach-4-billion-following- 15-per-cent-growth2013 [https://perma.cc/9YFN-R4W5]; see also Sarah Butler, Ethical Shopping Growing in
Popularity,
Survey
Suggests,
GUARDIAN
(Aug.
19,
2013,
12:38
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/aug/19/ethical-shopping-growing-popularityfairtrade [https://perma.cc/XC6U-6ZFD] ("British shoppers are three times more likely to choose
environmentally friendly products than they were in 2011, despite the squeeze on their incomes.

A quarter of UK consumers said they would take the green option even if it cost them more
money, up from 8% 17 months earlier . . . . The UK trend reflects a global surge in interest in
environmentally friendly products with the proportion of consumers prepared to pay more to
protect the natural world more than doubling to 46% last autumn from 22% in spring 2011.').
For a discussion of the importance of labeling, see discussion infra Parts I.B, II.A.
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firm that manages more than $6 trillion in investments, including
$1.7 trillion in active funds, and on January 16, 2018, its founder and
chief executive officer (CEO) made headlines by sending an open letter
to CEOs of major public companies. 27 The letter emphasized that
"[c]ompanies must benefit all of their stakeholders, including
shareholders, employees, customers, and the communities in which
they operate" 28 and reminded CEOs that "BlackRock can choose to sell
the securities of a company [in its active funds] if [it is] doubtful about
its strategic direction or long-term growth" and that it planned to
engage more with the companies in BlackRock's index funds. 29 Fink
stated that for companies "[t]o sustain [their financial performance],
[they] must also understand the societal impact of [their] business[es]
as well as the ways that broad, structural trends-from slow wage
growth to rising automation to climate change-affect [their] potential
for growth." 30
While some view corporate statements about
contributing to society as "marketing gimmick[s] aimed at raising
profits or appeasing regulators," 3 1 the statement is consistent with
other ways that BlackRock has worked to influence corporate policy in
recent years. 32 Moreover, impact investment-that is, investment
from which the expected returns include social and environmental, as
well as financial, benefitS 33-was a growing area even before Fink's
letter.
Total investment in "some form of Socially Responsible
Investing" was already reported to be around $3.7 trillion in the
United States. 34 In a 2017 survey, 205 respondents from the financial
27.

Andrew Ross Sorkin, BlackRock's Message: Contribute to Society, or Risk Losing Our

Support, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/15/
business/dealbook/blackrock-laurence-fink-letter.html
[https://perma.ccUSC6-HWH6];
Larry
Fink,
Larry Fink's Annual Letter to
CEOs: A Sense of Purpose,
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-us/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter

BLACKROCK,

[https://perma.cc/MM4Z-JS2G] (last visited Jan. 28, 2018).
28.
Fink, supra note 27.
29.
Id.
30.
Id. (stating further that BlackRock "will continue to emphasize the importance of a
diverse board" because "[b]oards with a diverse mix of genders, ethnicities, career experiences,
and ways of thinking have, as a result, a more diverse and aware mindset. They are less likely to
succumb to groupthink or miss new threats to a company's business model. And they are better
able to identify opportunities that promote long-term growth.").
31.
Sorkin, supra note 27.
See id. (describing BlackRock's successful 2017 effort to support a shareholder
32.
proposal that would improve Exxon's climate disclosures).
33.

Impact Investing, GLOBAL IMPACT INVESTING NETWORK, https://thegiin.org/impact-

investing/ [https:/perma.cc/QG86-E5FW] (last visited Dec. 21, 2017); ABHILASH MUDALIAR ET
AL.,

GLOB.

IMPACT INVESTING NETWORK,

ANNUAL IMPACT INVESTOR SURVEY, at I (2017),

https://thegiin.org/assets/GIINAnnuallmpactInvestorSurvey_2017_Web-Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GN5U-RK6W].
34.
Legal FAQS, supra note 19; see also FAQ: General Questions, supra note 19.
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industry said they made $22.142 billion in 7,951 "impact investments"
in 2016 and had planned to invest $25.905 billion in 9,557 impact
investments in 2017.35
Parallel to the growth in the demand for socially responsible
products and services, the PBC has emerged as a new corporate form
As "for-profit
with a recent surge in popularity and recognition.
stakeholders,
morals or
that
want
to
consider
additional
companies
missions in addition to making a profit for their shareholders," 3 6 PBCs
explicitly derive investment value from an expanded corporate
purpose to operate in a socially responsible way. 3 7 At least three
thousand companies, 38 including such household names as Patagonia
and Kickstarter, have formed or reorganized as PBCs, 39 and experts
expect PBCs to draw increasing levels of investment and consumer
interest. 40 Thirty-four states-including Delaware 41-and the District
of Columbia 42 passed statutes authorizing the PBC, and six additional
states are drafting similar legislation. 43 These statutes require PBCs
to strive beyond the sole aim of maximizing value for shareholders;
also, PBCs must fulfill additional reporting and disclosure
requirements, including evaluations of "how well the corporation
provides the requisite general public benefit." 44 Some statutes, such
as the authorizing statute for PBCs in Delaware, require that the
companies reveal the "standards the board of directors has adopted to

35.

MUDALIAR ET AL., supra note 33, at 4 tbl.2.

36.

FAQ: General Questions, supra note 19.

have an expanded purpose beyond maximizing share
Id. ("Benefit Corporations ...
37.
value to explicitly include general and specific public benefit."); Legal FAQS, supra note 19
("Benefit corp[oration]s create an attractive investment opportunity for the same nearly 70
Million [sic] 'conscious consumers' that have fueled organics, fair trade, and 'buy local,' while
enjoying a form of inoculation from the short-termism that plague public equity
markets. . . . Does benefit corporation status make it more difficult to raise money? No. Benefit
corporations are attractive to a large and growing market for socially responsible and impact
investments.").
Benefit Corporations Raising Capital, BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp.netfbenefit38.
corporations-raising-capital [https://perma.cc/7YMK-JX9K] (last visited Dec. 21, 2017).
39.

Find a Benefit Corp, BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp.net/businesses/find-a-benefit-

corp?field-bcorp-certified-value=&state=&title=&submit2=Go&sort by-title&sortorder=ASC&
op=Go&page=4 [https://perma.cclX2C5-L4NR] (last visited Dec. 21, 2017).
40.
Legal FAQS, supra note 19; see also FAQ: General Questions, supranote 19.
41.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 361-368 (West 2017).
42.
D.C. CODE §§ 29-1301.01 to -1304.01 (2017).
43.
See
State
by
State
Status
of
Legislation,
BENEFIT
CORP.,
(last
[https://perma.ccVFU6-BYFP]
http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status
visited Dec. 21, 2017).
44.
John Montgomery, Mastering the Benefit Corporation, A.B.A.: BUS. L. TODAY (July
2016),
https://www.americanbar.org/publicationsfblt/2016/07/02-montgomery.html
[https://perma.ce/37GA-6S3S].
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measure the corporation's progress in promoting such public
benefit," 6 and "an assessment of the corporation's success in meeting
the objectives and promoting such public benefit." 46 However, the
Delaware law does not require that these statements be made public
or that the standards and certifications used to assess the purported
public benefit be "a third-party standard." 47
In addition to the legal corporate form of the PBC, companies
and entities may also or alternatively qualify for "B Corp"
certification. 4 8 The nonprofit organization B Lab will bestow this
qualification on companies if they "commit to meeting certain
standards of overall social and environmental performance on an
ongoing basis." 49 The B Corp certification may allow companies to
capitalize on the same market for social responsibility as legal PBCs
because both are seen as advancing the goal of "us[ing] the power of
business for the higher purpose of solving society's most challenging
problems."5 0
As the consumer market for sustainably and responsibly
sourced products and services and the investor market for shares in
companies that engage in these responsible practices continue to
expand, the stakes grow higher for interested parties to be able to
verify that these business practices are as responsible as purported.
However, B Corp certification does not legally bind directors through
their fiduciary duties, and legal PBCs are not necessarily required to
This raises the question of how
meet third-party standards.5 1

45.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366(b)(2).
46.
Id. § 366(b)(4).
Id. § 366(c)(2), (3) ("The certificate of incorporation or bylaws of a public benefit
47.
corporation may require that the corporation: . . . (2) Make the statement [required by statute to
describe the PBC's promotion of a public benefit] available to the public; and/or (3) Use a thirdparty standard in connection with and/or attain a periodic third-party certification addressing
the corporation's promotion of the public benefit[.]").
48.

PATAGONIA

WORKS,

ANNUAL

BENEFIT

CORPORATION

REPORT

3,

15

(2013),

&

http://www.patagonia.com/on/demandware. static/Sites-patagonia-us-Site/Library- SitesPatagoniaSharedlenUS/PDF-US/bcorp-annualreport_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KDN-AT2S];
Benefit Corporations & Certified B Corps, BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp.net/businesses/
benefit-corporations-and-certified-b-corps [https://perma.cc/7QVM-7RE7] (last visited Nov. 14,
2017) ("Patagonia . . . [is an] exampl[e] of [a] benefit corporatio[n] that subsequent[t to
incorporation under the PBC authorizing statute also] became [a] Certified B Corporatio[n]
because [it] felt the certification had additional value.").
A Corporate Paradigm Shift: Public Benefit Corporations, GIBSON, DUNN
49.
CRUTCHER (Aug. 9, 2016), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/Corporate-ParadigmShift-Public-Benefit-Corporations.aspx [https://perma.cc/E7CF-JWNT].
Benefit Corporations& Certified B Corps, supra note 48.
50.
Id. ("While many benefit corporations use the B Impact Assessment to create a free
51.
benefit report, benefit corporations do not need to reach a particular score, nor have their
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directors of PBCs and B Lab go about verifying that the corporations
or the certified companies have met an acceptable threshold for
sufficiently responsible business practices. In short, what are the
standards, and how are they verified?
B. Standards, Certification, and Labeling Systems
Commentators have defined "standard" to mean "something
taken for a basis of comparison, or that which is accepted for current
use through authority, custom, or general consent," 52 or as "any set of
technical specifications that either provides or is intended to provide a
common design for a product or process." 5 3

The National Research

Council, meanwhile, defines a "standard" as "a set of characteristics or
quantities that describes features of a product, process, service,
Furthermore, Justice Stephen Breyer
interface, or material."5 4
believes that agencies should distinguish between performance and
design standards.55
In his book Regulation and Its Reform,
then-Judge Breyer described the difference between the two in the
following terms:
A design standard specifies precisely how, say, a machine must be built. . . . A
performance standard, by contrast, states its obligations in terms of ultimate goals
The firm then is free to achieve these goals in any
that must be achieved.
appropriate way. . . . In principle, design standards are easier to enforce than
performance standards. . . . On the other hand, design standards limit the firm's
56
flexibility.

Performance standards exemplify standards that are "inclusive" and
allow for multiple methods for reaching the same goal.5 7 Sometimes,
reevaluation of the standard after it has already been implemented
becomes necessary.5 8 There is the risk that a "lock-in" effect may

performance verified or audited by B Lab, or anyone else."); see also, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
366.
52.
Harry S. Gerla, Federal Antitrust Law and Trade and Professional Association
Standardsand Certification, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 471, 472 (1994) (quoting DAVID HEMENWAY,
INDUSTRYWIDE VOLUNTARY PRODUCT STANDARDS 8 (1975)).

53.

Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations,

90 CALIF. L. REV. 1889, 1896 (2002).
54.

NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STANDARDS, CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT, AND TRADE: INTO

THE 21ST CENTURY 9 (1995).
55.

STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 105 (1982).

56.

Id.

David J. Teece & Edward F. Sherry, Standards Setting and Antitrust, 87 MINN L.
57.
REV. 1913, 1934 (2003) ("For example, many health and safety standards are 'inclusive' in the
sense that quite different products (e.g., wood, aluminum, and fiberglass ladders) can all satisfy
the standard.").
Id. at 1936.
58.
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occur because changing a standard after implementing it costs more
than an ex ante choice between alternative standards. 59
As discussed below, numerous types of entities can create
standards for many different contexts and purposes. Government
regulators create mandatory compliance standards, but companies
sometimes also have a hand in creating voluntary compliance
standards. Once a standard is established, "certification" involves the
"decision on whether a particular product, service, or provider meets
Therefore, the crucial step for the modern
the standard." 60
sustainability market is in verifying and communicating to customers
the companies' compliance with trusted standards concerning the
social or environmental responsibility underlying the production or
provision of the good or service. In many industries, the primary
method of communicating to consumers that products have been
certified as meeting established standards is through labeling, such as
the fair trade label.6 1 Therefore, such a system of certifying and
communicating compliance with a production standard should also be
standardized to ensure that products across a spectrum of companies
genuinely comply and are not "greenwashed" or "fairwashed."62 For
reasons discussed below, voluntary standard setting would be an
environmental
social
and
ensuring
method
of
effective
behavior,
and
a
uniform
in
business
conscientiousness
blockchain-based system would provide the ideal characteristics for
verifying compliance with such standards.
1. The Economic Rationale for Voluntary Standard Setting
Private standards systems can mitigate several market failures
associated with businesses' externalities and transaction costs.
Economist Arthur Pigou theorized that taxing activities that produce
negative externalities would reduce the social cost of those activities
by increasing the price of the resulting product. 63 The increase in
price would lower demand, production, and, in turn, the overall social
cost of the activity." Ronald Coase further theorized that in a world
in which no transaction costs arose from negotiating an exchange,
59.
Id. at 1937-38.
Gerla, supra note 52, at 473.
60.
61.
See infra Part II.A.
62.
Roberts, supra note 11, at 147; CBS Miami, Fair Trade Products Grow in Popularity
Along with Fakes, FAIR WORLD PROJECT (Aug. 17, 2011), http://fairworldproject.org/in-thenews/fair-trade-products-grow-in-popularity-along-with-fakes/ [https://perma.cc/B6DH-AAAT].
63.
Roberts, supra note 11, at 112. See generally A. C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF
WELFARE (4th ed. 1932).
Roberts, supra note 11, at 112.
64.
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"parties will exchange entitlements until a Pareto efficient allocation
occurs." 6 5 However, in contrast to this Coasian ideal, "no one makes
an assumption of no transaction costs in practice."6 6
Therefore,
according to Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed, when
entitlements are allocated in pursuit of a Pigouvian reduction in the
social costs of an activity, costs should fall on the "cheapest cost
avoider"-meaning the party in the best position to avoid, rather than
externalize, the cost.67 For example, the cost should fall on the party
in the best position to minimize pollution or instate socially beneficial
labor practices.68
The government is not always effective in determining the
Therefore, when the
proper entity or extent at which to tax. 69
government fails to fully address negative externalities through a tax
that would internalize them, the party in the best position to avoid
these negative externalities is the "best briber," 7 0 or the "party that
can, with the lowest transaction costs, use trade to correct an error in
entitlements[j:] . . . [that is,] the party that can most cheaply correct a
misallocation of entitlements.""
By allocating costs in this way,
Pareto efficiency is more likely to be achieved. 72 In the context of the
market for consumer goods, consumers are the best bribers because
they are in the best position to "negotiate a trade" with the
producers. 73 Producers are the cheapest cost avoiders because they
have direct control over their supply chains. 74
certificationsand
private
standards
Voluntary,
communicated to consumers through labeling-mitigate market
failures by easing consumers' negotiations with producers for trades of
entitlements in several ways. First, these standards and certifications

65.
R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1 (1960), cited in Roberts,
supra note 11, at 112. Pareto efficiency is the common metric by which economists determine the
presence of waste. It is achieved when transactions make at least one party better off without
making another party worse off. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 11, at 112 n.24.
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
66.
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1096 (1972), cited in Roberts,
supra note 11, at 113.
67.
Id. at 1119, 1127, cited in Roberts, supra note 11, at 114-15.
68.
See id. at 1096-97; see also Roberts, supra note 11, at 114-15.
69.

See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 11, at 137 ("When there are competing values at stake,

governments may allocate entitlements in ways that may be contrary to the desires of much of
the public.").
70.

11, at 115.
71.
72.
73.
74.

GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 150 (1970), cited in Roberts, supra note

Roberts, supra note 11, at 114-15.
Id. at 115.
Id. at 117 n.47, 120.
Id.
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"facilitat[e] communication between . . . parties" by lowering the

otherwise prohibitive transaction costs that consumers face in
overcoming information asymmetries and ascertaining companies'
methods of production, such as the labor practices implemented in
producing their clothing or the pesticides applied in growing their
vegetables.7 5 When information asymmetry prevents consumers from
knowing before purchasing a good whether it has been produced using
responsible methods, they cannot "reward or sanction the seller
through their repeat business and influence on others.

. . . This is a

market failure." 76 In contrast, when enough information is available
on both sides of this trade-that is, when there is information
symmetry-the trade will more likely meet each party's needs and
preferences to the point of Pareto efficiency.7 7
In addition, standards, certification, and labeling address the
market failure of collective action problems, which exist on both the
demand and supply side. On the demand side, consumers must form a
large enough demand bloc in order to incentivize producers to take on
the costs of implementing favorable production practices.7 8 For large
numbers of disperse consumers, this is a difficult feat, especially when
these collective action problems are exacerbated by information
asymmetry. On the supply side, producers must aggregate supply in
order to "sustain demand over time and reduce the price per unit to a
level that would be within reach for the average consumer." 79
Standards create a mutually-agreed-upon baseline for producers to
meet in order to consistently water to consumers with certain needs
and preferences, while trustworthy certification diminishes producers'
ability to engage in fraud "by selling goods of a different quality,
quantity or type than the buyers think they are purchasing."8 0
However, a moral hazard arises in the context of voluntary
standard setting and compliance. Voluntary standards could lead to
fraud and unfair misrepresentation, such as in organizations that use
advertising and labels to claim adherence to environmental and social
standards while failing to take meaningful action to address these
concerns, a practice known as "greenwashing" 81 or "fairwashing." 82
75.
Id. at 120.
76.
Id. at 123.
77.
Id. at 120 (citing Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 66, at 1096-97).
78.
Id. at 121.
79.
Id. at 118.
80.
Id. at 118, 123.
81.
Id. at 147.
82.
CBS Miami, supra note 62 ("'What's going right now on [sic] in the Fair Trade
Industry is what we're calling 'fairwashing.' It's a play off of the term 'greenwashing,' where
some companies are claiming to be Fair Trade and may not necessarily be Fair Trade so the onus
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The "clean diesel" scandal, 83 in which VW admitted to outfitting its
vehicles with devices meant to cheat state emissions tests," was such
a deceitful example of greenwashing 8 5-as well as blatantly illegal
behavior-that officials arrested company executives on conspiracy
charges. 86 However, most greenwashing is not nearly so overt and
instead arises from subtle distinctions between marketing messages
and the realities of a product.8 7 For example, in 2014 one sustainable
business journalist described plant-based plastics used in Coca-Cola's
PET "PlantBottle" and Cargill's "NatureWorks" bioplastic as examples
of greenwashing.8 8 According to the journalist, the "biggest downside
of bioplastic is that it has been introduced to consumer products with
a heaping dose of confusing marketing" regarding the makeup and
recyclability of these plastics. 8 9 For instance, "non-compostable plastic

is branded as if it were compostable (what do you think when you hear

falls on the consumer to ask the right questions, find out why is it Fair Trade, what makes it
Fair Trade?' explained Megy Karydes of World Shoppe.com.").
Hiroko Tabuchi, Jack Ewing & Matt Apuzzo, 6 Volkswagen Executives Charged as
83.
Company
Pleads Guilty in
Emissions
Case, N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
11,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/1 1/business/volkswagen-diesel-vw-settlement-chargescriminal.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/P3GN-LHZW] ("Volkswagen also formally pleaded guilty to
charges of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and to violate the Clean Air Act, customs violations
and obstruction of justice. Many of the 600,000 cars in the United States equipped with
emissions-cheating software were imported from Germany or Mexico.").
See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
84.
85.
See, e.g., Earth Day 2016: Seven Companies Accused of Greenwashing,
TRUTHINADVERTISING.ORG

(Apr. 22,

2016),

https://www.truthinadvertising.org/six-companies-

accused-greenwashing/ [https://perma.cclKY6V-7LXJ] ("There's nothing clean about diesel
engines that spew pollutants at levels way over the legal limit. But that seems to be the scandal
of the day in the automotive industry. . . . In March, the FTC became the third federal agency to
get involved in the VW emissions scam, filing a false advertising lawsuit against Volkswagen
Group of America seeking refunds for eco-minded consumers who purchased or leased an
affected Volkswagen or Volkswagen-owned Audi between 2008 and 2015.").
Adam Goldman, Hiroko Tabuchi & Jack Ewing, F.B.I. Arrests Volkswagen Executive
86.
on
Conspiracy Charge in Emissions Scandal,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
9,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/09/business/volkswagen-diesel-emissions-investigationsettlement.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/NEG9-7YBN] ("The F.B.I. has arrested a Volkswagen
executive in Florida, accusing him of playing a central role in a broad conspiracy to keep United
States regulators from discovering that diesel vehicles made by the company were programmed
to cheat on emissions tests. . . . The arrest of [the executive, Oliver] Schmidt[,] is an escalation of
the criminal investigation into emissions cheating by Volkswagen and comes amid talks between
the company and the United States Justice Department about what penalties the carmaker
should accept as part of a settlement.").

See Mary Catherine O'Connor, Five Sustainable Boondoggles: GreenwashingAll the
87.
Way to the Bank, GUARDIAN (Aug. 25, 2014, 7:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainablebusiness/2014/aug/25/5-sustainability-greenwash-products-ecofriendly-boondoggles-design
[https://perma.cc/TF84-PXRF].
88.
Id.
Id.
89.
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'PlantBottle'?), and non-recyclable bioplastic is positioned as a
seamless swap-in for oil-based cups and clamshells." 90 Therefore, the
crucial economic role that voluntary standards systems fill must be
supplemented with reliable and accountable certification.
2. The Legal Role of Voluntary Standard Setting
In addition to addressing market failures, voluntary standard
setting can fill gaps left by legal limitations that arise when
standard setting is left to government regulation. One gap in the
effectiveness of governmental regulation is the "jurisdictional
disjunction" 91 in enforcement, which occurs when a firm's supply chain
extends beyond the reach of any one legal authority. In this situation,
"[t]he government agency petitioned by those harmed may have only
incomplete authority over the subject matter or the persons, places or
goods involved in the dispute." 92 Furthermore, the "aggrieved parties
may not have access to or the right to summon the authority of the
governing body that has jurisdiction over the individuals or firms
causing the impacts." 93 In the modern world, virtually no consumer
buys a product that is completely untouched by some aspect of a
supply chain of global, or at least transnational, proportions. 94
In addition to jurisdictional limits to enforcement, governments
also face restrictions concerning how they may regulate within their
jurisdictions.9 5 World Trade Organization (WTO) rules prohibit states
from instating measures, known as "Technical Barriers to Trade," that
have a discriminatory effect on "like" products being imported into a
member country.96 That is, member countries must accord national
90.
Id. ("Core to the confusion is a major bifurcation among bioplastics. Some-such as
Coca-Cola's PET 'PlantBottle'-are chemically identical to conventional plastic but use (around
30%) plant-based feedstocks. These are recyclable, which would be more encouraging if the PET
recycling rate in the US was higher than its paltry 25%. Other material-such as Cargill's
'NatureWorks' bioplastic-is derived from fermented plant sugars that are plasticized into
polylactide (PLA). These are not recyclable. But they are compostable-though only in industrial
composting facilities, not in your backyard garden pile.").
Roberts, supra note 11, at 134 ("Jurisdictional disjunction describes the situation
91.
where the geography of the firms, the resources or the harms to be regulated and the jurisdiction
of the state or agency that seeks to regulate them may not align.").
92.
Id. at 134-35.
Id. at 135.
93.
94.
See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL
TRANSACTIONS: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 12-15 (3d ed. 2015).

BUSINESS

95.
Roberts, supra note 11, at 134-35.
96.
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade art. 2.1, Jan. 1, 1995, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120
[hereinafter TBT Agreement]; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
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treatment to like products by agreeing not to instate laws or
regulations in their own countries that prohibit or place price
premiums on foreign products entering their domestic commerce.
Additionally, the WTO requires member countries to include most
favored nation clauses in their trade agreements, thus preventing one
nation's products from receiving more favorable treatment than
another's. 97
Though the WTO agreements acknowledge the
importance of certain environmental concerns, 9 8 parties to the WTO
may not distinguish between goods based on process and production
methods, which might include the levels of greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions made during such production or during other aspects of
socially and environmentally responsible production9 9 :
Distinctions based on whether the goods were extracted, harvested or
manufactured under humane or inhumane conditions, using fair labor practices or
child and slave labor, or adhering to environmental controls or causing
10 0
environmental harm, would all be classified as process distinctions.

Therefore, a country cannot impose an internal tax, border tariff, or
quantitative restriction on imported products based on considerations
about their process of production, such as the environmental concern
of their level of GHG emissions. 101
Private entities, however, do not fall under WTO jurisdiction
because WTO agreements bind only member states. 102 Therefore, the
limited ability of governments to regulate the introduction into
national commerce of internationally produced goods based on their
production processes can best be remedied through consumers'
prerogative to "vote" with their dollars. 103 To exercise such power,

art. 3, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]; see also Roberts, supra
note 11, at 137-38.
97.
TBT Agreement, supra note 96, art. 2.1; GATT, supra note 96, art. 3; see also Susy
Frankel & Daniel Gervais, Plain Packagingand the Interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement, 46
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1149, 1152 (2013); Roberts, supra note 11, at 138.
See, e.g., GATT, supra note 96, art. 20.
98.
99.
See TBT Agreement, supra note 96, annex 1(1) (defining the "technical regulations"
governed by Article 2.1 to include those related to "process and production methods"); see also
Roberts, supra note 11, at 138.

100.
101.
102.
103.

See, e.g., id.
GATT, supra note 96, arts. 1-3, 11; Roberts, supra note 11, at 138.
GATT, supra note 96, art. 1; see also Roberts, supra note 11, at 138-39.
Roberts, supra note 11, at 139 ("[W]hen competing values relating to health, safety

and the environment require regulation, and when international trade

agreements would

otherwise bar action by a nation state or its organs, the public has employed voluntary
standards, certification and labeling systems to meet the demand for governance. By taking their
concerns out of the governmental and legislative processes and creating a new institution outside
of those contexts, the proponents and developers of these institutions have circumvented

entrenched interests and political barriers." (footnote omitted)).
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consumers must be able to efficiently learn reliable information about
the international supply chains of huge, global companies. Blockchain
technology has emerged as a way to ascertain and communicate this
information.
C. Blockchain Technology
Blockchain technology has been described as "[t]he great chain
of being sure about things." 104 In the age of the "sharing economy"10 5
and "online trust," 10 6 a process in which distant, unfamiliar
individuals independently verify the validity or reliability of a
transaction is not entirely unheard-of. Online review systems drive
businesses such as Uber and Airbnb.10 7 Rather than writing a review
about a person's ride or stay that anyone may access to determine the
quality of a driver or host, blockchain technology virtually guarantees
validity and reliability through several features. The first important
feature of blockchain technology is transparency.10 8 A blockchain
records and time-stamps transactions in "blocks" that anyone with
access to the online network may view to verify that the transaction
A second important blockchain- feature is
actually occurred. 109
110
is split up and distributed over all
A
blockchain
decentralization.
computers across its network rather than being stored and supervised
by a central intermediary.1 1 1 Finally, a key feature of blockchain

104.
The Great Chain of Being Sure About Things, ECONOMIST (Oct. 31, 2015),
https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21677228-technology-behind-bitcoin-lets-people-whosee also
[https://perma.cc/GW63-MAH6];
do-not-know-or-trust-each-other-build-dependable
Rachel Bostman, We've Stopped Trusting Institutions and Started Trusting Strangers, TED
(June 2016)
(citing The Great Chain of Being Sure About Things, supra),
https://www.ted.com/talks/rachel-botsmanwe_ve-stopped-trusting-institutions-and-started-tr
usting-strangers [https://perma.cc/9H27-4ENT].
105.
See Abbey Stemler, Regulation 2.0: The Marriage of New Governance and Lex
Informatica, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 87, 110-14 (2016); The Rise of the Sharing Economy,
(Mar.
9,
2013),
https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/2 1573104-internetECONOMIST
everything-hire-rise-sharing-economy [https://perma.cc/46RR-PRKX].
Bostman, supra note 104.
106.
107.
See Abbey Stemler, Feedback Loop Failure:Implications for the Self-Regulation of
the Sharing Economy, 18 MINN. J.L. ScI. & TECH. 673, 674-75 (2017); Bostman, supra note 104.
108.
Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Legal Education in the
Blockchain Revolution, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 351, 363-65 (2017).
109.
See id. at 365-66; see also Collin Thompson, How Does the Blockchain Work? (Part
1), BLOCKCHAIN REV. (Oct. 2, 2016), https://medium.com/blockchain-review/how-does-theblockchain-work-for-dummies-explained-simply-9f94d386e093 [https://perma.cc/3MS9-7PG7].
110.
See Fenwick, Kaal & Vermeulen, supra note 108, at 363-67, 369-71; see also
Thompson, supra note 109.
111.
See Fenwick, Kaal & Vermeulen, supra note 108, at 363-67, 369-71; see also
Thompson, supra note 109.
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technology is its immutability. 1 1 2
Information about transactions
stored on a blockchain is essentially tamperproof. 118
Individual
1 14
members of the network, known as "miners,"
contribute their
computers' power to digitally sign each new block via complex
cryptography, known as "hashing,"11 5 and repeatedly check the
blockchain against previous versions. Inconsistent blocks-such as
those created by someone trying to hack and alter a transaction-are
automatically discarded by the system. Miners typically receive a
financial incentive for contributing their computer's power. 116
Blockchain's role as the basis of the Bitcoin cryptocurrency
thrust it into prominence and created a widespread fascination with
its potential for other uses. 117 Bitcoin uses blockchain to "allow online
payments to be sent directly from one party to another without going
through a financial institution."1 1 8
When a user accessing the
blockchain from his or her computer validates a transaction, that new
transaction gets added to information stored in a "block," which gets
linked to older transaction "blocks" containing information about all
previous transactions.1 19 A chain of blocks is thereby traceable back to
its first transaction. 12 0 In essence, this chain of data is "really just a
ledger" in which "all interested parties run copies of the ledger and

112.
See Fenwick, Kaal & Vermeulen, supra note 108, at 364-65, 367, 374; see also
Thompson, supra note 109.
113.
See Thompson, supra note 109.
114.
Id.
115.
See Fenwick, Kaal & Vermeulen, supra note 108, at 367; Rob Marvin, Blockchain
A-Z: Everything You Need to Know About the Game-Changing Tech Beneath Bitcoin, PCMAG
(June 3, 2016, 4:18 PM), https://www.pcmag.com/article/344969/blockchain-a-z-everything-youneed-to-know-about-the-game-c [https://perma.cc/TH73-Y4UX].
116.
Thompson, supra note 109. In the case of the Bitcoin blockchain, miners could create
and receive new bitcoins over time. Id.
117.
Victor Li, Bitcoin's Blockchain Technology Being Used in Business,
Finance and Contracts, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 1, 2016), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/
article/bitcoins underlying-technology blockchain-gains use in business finance and
[https://perma.cclX84A-T'KT] ("For many people, their introduction to the digital currency
bitcoin came when federal agents shut down online black market Silk Road.... While bitcoin is
a relatively recent phenomenon, blockchain is old news and has been around since the 1990s. It
wasn't really used for much until bitcoin came around. . . . Now many financial tech companies
are using blockchain, and nearly every major bank is investing in it."); Luke Parker, AID: Tech
Offers Blockchain Solutions to Help United Nations and European Commission with Refugee
Problems, BRAVE NEW COIN (Oct. 2, 2016), http://bravenewcoin.com/news/aidtech-offersblockchain-solutions-to-help-united-nations-and-european-commission-with-refugee-problems/
[https://perma.cc/B844-G4GQ].
SATOSHI NAKAMoTo, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH SYSTEM 1 (2008)
118.
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BSF-2S7W].
119.
Thompson, supranote 109.
120.
Id.
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contribute to it and add entries to the ledger in a systematic way." 12 1
However, unlike a traditional ledger in which one supervisory party
keeps track of everything and controls access to the ledger, a public
blockchain ledger is, as explained above, "transparent and
immutable" 122 and widely accessible. Blockchain technology could
have a useful purpose in the realm of corporate social responsibility.
II. ANALYSIS
The business world demonstrates an increasing acceptance of
and preference for corporate leadership that acts with societal and
environmental welfare, in addition to shareholder value, in mind. 123
The growing demand for sustainable products and services, the
corresponding changing practices and priorities of traditional
corporations, and the emergence of the PBC corporate form all signal
this shift. 124 Scholars and commentators have identified the resulting
complications that could arise in both law and business practice. 125 As
one corporate law professor wrote in the New York Times regarding
PBCs, "the eye-grabbing do-gooding may mask deep, complicated
issues. First, in a public benefit corporation, the benefit can be hard
Li, supra note 117.
121.
Id.; see also Fenwick, Kaal & Vermeulen, supra note 108, at 364-65 ("Blockchain
122.
technology eliminates the need for intermediation by incentivizing direct transactions-including
compensation-between the creator and consumer. Blockchain technology creates a platform for
trust through truth and transparency between parties. Because the blockchain (at least the
public blockchain) is in fact public and immutable, the technology increases transparency while
at the same time significantly reducing transaction costs. . . . Some refer to it as a giant,
worldwide, distributed, immutable 'Google spreadsheet' for transactions." (footnotes omitted)).
123.
See supra Part I.A.
See, e.g., Sorkin, supra note 14; see also supra Part I.A.
124.
See, e.g., Steve A. Peirce, Adding "Public Benefit" to the Bankruptcy Mix Raises
125.
Thorny Issues, FED. LAW., May-June 2014, at 18-19 ("Interesting issues could arise if a public
benefit corporation becomes insolvent or files bankruptcy. . . . In the case of an insolvent public
benefit corporation, one might argue . . . that a creditor would have standing to file a derivative
action. But what of § 367 [of Title 8 of the Delaware Code], limiting derivative action standing to
shareholders with certain ownership levels? Would § 367 foreclose any creditor derivative action?
Could an argument be made that creditors are among the public benefit constituents or that they
are persons 'materially affected'? Under that argument, would § 365(b), providing for no duty to
those nonshareholder constituents, foreclose any action by creditors? . . . With the advent of
public benefit corporations, the priorities of the various corporate stakeholders get a little more
complicated, and it will be interesting to see how the courts sort this out."); see also Tiffany M.
Burba, To 'B" or Not to "B": Duties of Directors and Rights of Stakeholders in Benefit
Corporations, 70 VAND. L. REV. EN BANc 87, 87 (2017), https://s3.amazonaws.com/vu-wpO/wp-

content/uploads/sites/89/2017/04/20131135/To-%E2%80%9CB%E2%80%9D-or-not-to%E2%80%9CB%E2%80%9D-Duties-of-Directors-and-Rights-of-Stakeholders-in-BenefitCorporations.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q328-99DQ] ("Although this corporate form adequately
responds to consumers' weariness of 'big business' and attracts shareholders who value social
responsibility more than short-term gains, it raises questions regarding benefit enforcement.").
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to define." 12 6 Because of the disparate ideas of what this definition
should be, commentators argue that the PBC form is not practical for
publicly traded companies or those that want to go public. 127
Furthermore, in the context of traditional corporations that claim to
espouse sustainable business practices, that claim can be difficult to
verify. In response to these issues, the method by which corporations
and PBCs measure their social and environmental impact may need a
greater degree of uniformity. Moreover, in the process of establishing
this uniformity, proponents must consider the antitrust issues
inherent in industry-wide agreements. 128
A. The Need for Uniformity in Standard and CertificationSystems
1. The General Corporate Context
The ability of voluntary standard, certification, and labeling
systems to fill the gaps left by governmental regulation is undermined
when there are many dispersed forms of such standards among which
consumers are unable to distinguish or meaningfully evaluate. 129 The
need for homogenization of standard certification has already been
recognized on the international level, and efforts have begun to

Steven Davidoff Solomon, Idealism That May Leave Shareholders Wishing for
126.
Pragmatism, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Oct. 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/14/
business/dealbook/laureate-education-for-profit-school-public-benefit.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cclFB8X-3JEQ].
127.
Id.; see also Lois Yurow, Benefit Corporationsand the Public Markets-Will We Ever
See a Public Benefit Corporation?, GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY INST'S SUSTAINABILITY

UPDATE (Nov. 24, 2014), http://ga-institute.com/Sustainability-Update/2014/11/24/benefitcorporations-and-the-public-markets-will-we-ever-see-a-public-benefit-corporation/
[https://perma.cclPV7X-Z77R].
128.
See generally Alden F. Abbott, US Government Antitrust Intervention in
Standard-SettingActivities and the Competitive Process, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 225,
232-33 (2016).
See, e.g., Ulf J. J. Hahnel et al., The Power of Putting a Label on It: Green Labels
129.
Weigh Heavier Than ContradictingProduct Information for Consumers'Purchase Decisions and
1,
1,
2015,
at
PSYCHOL.,
Sept.
FRONTIERS
Behavior,
Post-Purchase
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4585300/ [https://perma.cc/2FLQ-W35J]; see also
Clare D'Souza, Mehdi Taghian, Peter Lamb & Roman Peretiatko, Green Decisions: Demographics
and Consumer Understandingof Environmental Labels, 31 INT'L J. CONSUMER STUD. 371, 372,
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1470-6431.2006.00567.x/abstract
(2007),
375
[https://perma.cc/69SH-2HTF] ("Australian consumers appear to have poor knowledge regarding
labels and label types. . . . To compound this, there have been ineffectife advertising campaigns
regarding environmental labels. . . . There are different types of environmental labels that
consumers are exposed to on a daily basis, while some consumers may not be able to properly
identify and understand them.. .. Industry groups argue that certification of third party green
labels offers some positive benefits such as increased credibility and better forms of
communications.").
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consolidate the public, private, and hybrid standards requirements
into a "common language." 130 These types of efforts constitute one
response to the ongoing reality that the array of organizations and
entities that establish standards, certification, and labeling systems
remains highly complex. 131 These organizations and entities include
and nonprofit),
organizations
(both for-profit
private-sector
governmental organizations, and organizations that are somewhere in
between.132
Third-party, for-profit entities have emerged that strive to hold
producers accountable for the environmental and social impacts of
their production practices and supply chains. 133
For example,
GoodGuide, Inc. aims to "rate products so that consumers can have
instant access [through a website and an app] to credible information
about products that would be very difficult for anyone to develop on
their own." 1 34 However, the company's website admits that problems
arise from information asymmetry and the difficulty of tracking a
Despite "acquir[ing] data from over 1,000
product's origins. 135
different sources, including scientific institutions, governmental
nongovernmental
data
aggregators,
agencies,
commercial
organizations, media outlets and corporations," the GoodGuide
website states that in many cases, "data that would be relevant for a
thorough assessment of an important attribute is unavailable for a
product." 136 Some gaps in GoodGuide's data exist because it has not
yet found a credible source, and sometimes the data may not be not
publicly available because "companies have not disclosed critical
The weaknesses in this data system, to which
information."1 37
GoodGuide admits, illustrate some of the greater problems with a lack
of uniform standards and certification systems and the important fact
that the current system remains reliant on voluntary company
disclosures. 138

130.
INT'L TRADE CTR., MAKING SUSTAINABLE SUPPLY CHAINS A REALITY: TRADE FOR
5 (2015), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/devel-e/a4t-e/
SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT

global reviewl5prog-elbrochuresideeventsl9.pdf[https://perma.ccZMM3-DLTBI.
131.

See id.

132.
Teece & Sherry, supra note 57, at 1917.
http://www.goodguide.com/about
133.
See, e.g., About GoodGuide, GOODGUIDE,
[https://perma.cc/7Z3Y-UZLL] (last visited Jan. 2, 2018).
134.
Id.
0
http://www.goodguide.com/about/data
135.
See
GoodGuide's Data, GOODGUIDE,
[https://perma.cc/BDB8-Z9T8] (last visited Jan. 2, 2018).
Id.
136.
137.

Id.

138.

See id.
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Perhaps one of the most famous terms associated with the
verification of corporate supply chain sustainability is "fair trade."
High consumer recognition of the words "fair trade" on a label 39
demonstrates the extent to which voluntary standard setting can
create a "market for resource protection and sustainable resource
harvesting practices."1 40
Large corporate producers such as
Starbucks,141 Whole Foods Market,1 42 Bigelow Tea,1 43 and Pottery
Barn 44 benefit from some form of fair trade certification or labeling. 4 5
However, all fair trade labels are not the same. One product's fair
trade label or mark could have been bestowed by a different
organization than another product's fair trade label-for example,
Fair Trade USA1 46 resigned membership from the larger, international
139.
Paul Rice, Our 2016 Almanac, FAIR TRADE CERTIFIED (Sept. 25, 2017),
[https://perma.cc/L68Hhttps://www.fairtradecertified.org/news/2016-fair-trade-usa-almanac
GCBZ] ("Consumer awareness of [the Fair Trade USA] seal rose to 67%."); see also Certify Your
Products, FAIRTRADE AM., http://www.fairtradeamerica.org/For-Business/Ways-of-Working-with-

Fairtrade [https://perma.cc/F56D-HM2U] (last visited Jan. 27, 2018) ("The FAIRTRADE Mark is
the most trusted and recognized ethical label in the world. According to a 2017 Globescan study
of US consumers, 81% of them would view a brand they already buy more favorably if it carried
the FAIRTRADE Mark.").
140.
Roberts, supra note 11, at 130.
141.
All FairtradeProducts, FAIRTRADE AM., http://www.fairtradeamerica.org/FairtradeProducts/All [https://perma.cc/ZAD2-KMV2] (last visited Jan. 28, 2018) (listing "Starbucks Coffee
Company" as a "produc[t] bearing the FAIRTRADE Mark" and describing the mark as "a clear
direct link to the Fairtrade International system . . . [which involves] m[eeting] . . . social,

economic, and environmental criteria").
142.
Rice, supra note 139 ("This milestone [of certifing the first farm in the United States]
builds on our successful produce partnerships with leading retailers like Whole Foods."); see also
All FairtradeProducts, supranote 141 (listing "Whole Foods 365 brand sugar" and "Whole Foods
(frozen asparagus)" as "products bearing the FAIRTRADE Mark").
143.
RC Bigelow Incorporated, FAIR TRADE CERTIFIED, https://www.fairtradecertified.org/
searchlbrands?key=bigelow [https://perma.cclS5UTR-UAEF] (last visited Jan. 28, 2018).
144.

Pottery

Barn,

FAIR

TRADE

CERTIFIED,

https://www.fairtradecertified.org/

searchlbrands?key=%22pottery+barn%22 [https://perma.cc/3A3Z-WUAP] (last visited Jan. 27,
2018).
For some of Fair Trade USA's claims about its labels' benefits to businesses, see, for
145.
example, Rice, supra note 139 ("In 2016, the sale of Fair Trade Certified products in the U.S.
reached an estimated $6 billion."). For similar claims by Fairtrade International, see Why Go
Fairtrade?,

FAIRTRADE

AM.,

http://www.fairtradeamerica.org/For-Business/Why-Fairtrade

[https://perma.cc/Z2JU-YKZP] (last visited Jan. 28, 2018) ("74% of customers would recommend
Fairtrade products to a friend or colleague.... Fairtrade gives you: ... Access to the Fairtrade
International system with the ability to easily sell your Fairtrade labeled products in other
markets.").

146.
Rice, supra note 139 ("Fair Trade USA is the leading 501(c)(3) nonprofit, third-party
certifier and promoter of Fair Trade products in North America. . . . Fair Trade USA has worked
to . . . establis[h] the Fair Trade Certified seal as a respected and reliable brand for informed
consumer choices."); see also Carlos Nunez, US: Rise in Popularity of Fair Trade Produce,
FRESHPLAZA (Nov. 20, 2012), http://www.freshplaza.com/article/103274/US-Rise-in-popularity-offair-trade-produce [https://perma.cc/56E9-VVF2] (declaring that Fair Trade USA is the "largest
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organization Fairtrade International1 4 7 in 2011, while a separate
entity, Fairtrade America, remained associated with Fairtrade
International. 14 8 This split has resulted in multiple separate entities
retaining confusingly similar names.
To make matters more
complicated, in the organizations' lists of companies bearing their
respective fair trade labels, traditional corporate entities can be found
right alongside PBCs and companies that have received the B Corp
certification. For example, Patagonia officially organized as a PBC in
2012149 and is listed alongside RE1 150 on Fair Trade USA's list of
organizations with its certification; 15 1 in addition, Ben & Jerry's
earned B Corp certification in 2012152 and is on Fairtrade America's

third-party fair trade certifier in the United States" and aims to "identif[y] farmers who fairly
compensate their workers," to teach "disadvantaged communities to use the free market to their
advantage," and to "work with importers to ensure that farming communities where fair trade
produce is grown are fairly compensated for the sales their products generate").
147.

The

Fairtrade System,

FAIRTRADE

INT'L,

https://www.fairtrade.net/about-

fairtrade/fairtrade-system.html [https://perma.cc/ST8V-NCZ9] (last visited Jan. 28, 2018)
("Fairtrade International is a non-profit, multi-stakeholder association of 23 member
organizations-three producer networks and 20 national Fairtrade organizations. . . . The
international Fairtrade system includes Fairtrade International, nine Fairtrade Marketing
organizations, and FLOCERT (the independent certification body of the global Fairtrade
system).").
148.
See Q&A on Fairtrade International and Fair Trade USA, FAIRTRADE INT'L,
https://www.fairtrade.net/about-fairtrade/fairtrade-in-the-usa/on-flo-and-fair-trade-usa.html
[https://perma.ccD3XX-GR3G] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017); Who We Are, FAIRTRADE AM.,
http://fairtradeamerica.org/What-is-Fairtrade/Who-we-are
[https://perma.cc/MBQD-85DR] (last
visited Jan. 28, 2018) ("Fairtrade America is an independent non-profit 501(c)(3) organization
associated with the international Fairtrade system.").
149.
See PATAGONIA WORKS, supra note 48 ("The B Corporation movement is one of the
most
important
of our
lifetime,
which
is why-when
California
passed
the
legislation-[Patagonia's founder] was the first guy in line to sign up."); see also supra note 39
and accompanying text.
150.

RECREATIONAL

EQUIPMENT,

INC.,

BYLAwS,

https://www.rei.com/content/dam/

documents/pdflREI%2OBylaws/REI%2OBylaws.pdf [https://perma.cc9G77-8N76] ("ARTICLE I
Purpose and Principles . . . Pursuant to Section 24.06.032 of Revised Code of Washington
('RCW'), Chapter 24.06 (the 'Governing Statute'), REI elects to avail itself of the additional rights
and powers granted to cooperative associations under RCW 23.86.030(1), 23.86.105(1), 23.86.160
and 23.86.170."); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 23.86.030(1), 23.86.105(1), 23.86.160,
23.86.170 (West 2017). For Washington's statute regarding "Social Purpose Corporations," see
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 23B.25.005-150.
https://www.fairtradecertified.org/search/
Clothing, FAIR
TRADE
CERTIFIED,
151.
brands?key=&brands%5BO%5D=category%3Aclothing&page=l
[https://perma.cc/83MJ-24NK]
(last visited Jan. 27, 2018).
Ben and Jerry's, B LAB, https://perma.cclWZ4T-54QV [https://perma.cc/ZP4D-KLY8]
152.
(last visited Jan. 27, 2018); see also Joe Van Brussel, Ben & Jerry's Becomes B-Corp Certified,
Adds

Credibility to

Impact

Investing Movement,

HUFFINGTON

POST

https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/23/ben-and-jerrys-b-corp-impactinvesting-n_2005315.html [https://perma.cclWZ4T-54QV].

(Oct.

25,

2012),
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list with Starbucks,1 53 which does not have B Corp certification.1 5 4
The average consumer may not be aware of the distinction between a
company that has met the corporate social responsibility requirements
for each of the various fair trade certifications and a company that has
incorporated as a PBC or received B Corp certification.
Organizations that fall somewhere between governmental and
nongovernmental are standard-setting organizations (SSOs) that are
"long-lived formal bodies . . . [with] delegated authority"15 5 and that

are

"quasi-governmental,

non-profit,

'umbrella

organization[s]

comprising hundreds of different special-purpose SSOs . . . [with]

numerous committees (or subcommittees) that adopt standards in
particular fields." 1 56

These SSOs can also take the form of "less

structured, often ad hoc consortia of interested parties formed for a
particular purpose."15 7 One example of such a consortium is the
Sustainable Rice Platform (SRP), "a multi-stakeholder platform,
co-convened by United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP)
and the International Rice Research Institute to promote resource
efficiency and sustainable trade flows, production and consumption
operations, and supply chains in the global rice sector."15 8 The SRP
includes more than sixty members ranging from Syngenta and Mars
Food, to the Sri Lanka Department of Agriculture and the Rice
Department of Thailand, to Fairtrade International. 15 9 The diversity
and scale of the SRP membership demonstrates the extent of the
complexity that can be involved in the SSO context.
social
The modern reality that certifying corporate
responsibility involves many different types of entities with varying
In the case of
levels of accountability creates several problems.
can easily
incentives
perverse
entities,
standard setting by private
take hold, and even where intentions are pure, there is a deficit of
public trust in such unilateral systems.1 60 The hybrid nature of quasi153.

All FairtradeProducts, supra note 141.

154.

Find

a

B

Corp,

B

LAB,

https://www.bcorporation.net/community/find-a-b-

corp?search=%22starbucks%22&field-industry-&field city=&field_state=&field_country=
[https://perma.cc/8FVP-SJFA] (last visited Jan. 28, 2018) (showing that the only results for the
search term "Starbucks" in the database of B Corp-certified companies are five companies that
mention Starbucks in their respective descriptions).
Teece & Sherry, supra note 57, at 1917.
155.
Id.
156.
Id.
157.
Sustainable Rice Platform, UNITED NATIONS ENv'T, http://drustage.unep.org/
158.
resourceefficiency/what-we-do/sustainable-lifestyles/food-and-food-waste/sustainable-agri-foodsupply-chains-0 [https://perma.cclY2AG-LTMN] (last visited Jan. 2, 2018).
159.

See

Members,

SUSTAINABLE

RICE

PLATFORM,

http://www.sustainablerice.org/

Get-Involved/#members-list [https://perma.cc/Q9AE-RC9S] (last visited Nov. 14, 2017).
See Teece & Sherry, supranote 57, at 1918.
160.
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governmental SSOs exacerbates concerns about confusion and
conflation of interests being protected. 161 The combination of all of
these market actors creates a situation that is, at best, confusing for
and, at worst, manipulative of consumers.1 62 The PBC context may
amplify these consequences and perverse incentives.1 6 3
2. The PBC Context
Lack of accountability in verifying compliance with standards
gives rise to additional problems in the context of PBCs.164 Not only is
the value that consumers, company shareholders, and stakeholders
place in PBCs rooted in the idea that they contribute a "public
benefit," therefore giving rise to a heightened need for verification of
this public benefit, but also current certification systems could
generate greater confusion about what incorporation under the PBC
form truly entails. 165 In Fair Trade USA's list of certified entities, the
juxtaposition of Patagonia, which is both a PBC and a B Lab-certified
B Corp, alongside other major corporations that fit neither of those
classifications but that nonetheless comply with Fair Trade USA's
requirements, illustrates the potential for consumer confusion about
the true nature of these companies.1 66
The current array of disparate nonprofit and for-profit entities
creates ambiguity and uncertainty about whether PBCs' practices live
up to the greater social conscientiousness that their corporate purpose
claims to espouse.1 67 If the aim of PBCs under the relatively vague
standard of advancing a "public benefit" is to hold much meaning, a
more uniform certification system may need to replace the current ad
hoc certification systems that are currently in place both for PBCs and
for the broader corporate environment. 68
B. Competition Issues with Standard Setting
Legal issues may arise in the process of establishing uniform
standards or certification practices in an industry or market,
particularly in the realm of antitrust. Because of the inherently
161.
See id.
162.
See id. at 1919-20.
163.
See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
See supra Part I.A.
164.
See supra Part I.A.
165.
166.
See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 139-48, 152-54
and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.A.
167.
168.
See supra Part I.A.
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procompetitive aspects of voluntary standardization and certification
behaviors, courts usually do not deem them to be per se antitrust
violations when challenged under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 169
Instead, courts tend to scrutinize them under the "rule of reason."1 70
Under that analysis, a court deems a challenged behavior legitimate if
its procompetitive effects outweigh its anticompetitive effects.1 7 1
These anticompetitive effects could amount to a violation of Section 1
of the Sherman Act1 72 when entities collude to conform to a certain
practice, such as standards or certification thereof, that effectively
constitute an agreement not to compete or, more broadly, any
"restraint of trade."
1. Procompetitive Effects of Standard Setting
For typical businesses, antitrust law recognizes that, in
general, "legitimate standard setting is not only procompetitive but
necessary for the proper functioning of modern economies." 174 Some
examples of procompetitive effects of standard and certification
systems include "[e]nhancement of rivalry, maintenance of consumer
Such
sovereignty, and the creation of economic efficiencies."1 75
economic efficiencies could include the elimination of some of the
market failures that occur in situations involving negative
externalities stemming from information asymmetries and transaction
costs, discussed above. 7 6 There are a few ways in which standards
and certification create these procompetitive effects. Standards and
certifications can diminish information asymmetry through their
"principal purpose of . . . provid[ing] customers with a way of
comparing product features (such as size and quality) across different
sellers."17 7

Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209, 209 (1890) (codified as amended at
169.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)); see, e.g., Nat'1 Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692
(1978).
Gerla, supra note 52, at 474, 494.
170.
Id. at 474; see also, e.g., Natl Soc'y ofProf7 Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 688.
171.
172.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) ("Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal.").
173.
174.
(2004).

175.
176.
177.

Id.
AM. BAR AsS'N, HANDBOOK ON THE ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF STANDARD SETTING 14

Gerla, supra note 52, at 475-76.
See supra Part I.B. 1.
Teece & Sherry, supra note 57, at 1916.
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If that type of standard (referred to as a "gradation standard") is
"provided for information purposes only,

raise competition policy

. . .

[it] would not appear to

concerns."1 78

2. Anticompetitive Effects of Standard Setting
Anticompetitive effects of standards that courts find
objectionable may include "injury to the competitive process,
diminution of rivalry, and output restrictions." 179 One "injury to the
competitive process" 18 0 that exists in standard setting involves
distortions in the establishment of those standards caused by perverse
incentives on the part of the standard setters. When the government
regulates a certain industry, capture can take place at various stages
of the process. Not only do industries lobby governments to influence
the typical legislative and regulatory processes but governments also
sometimes overtly adopt the standards set by private SSOs, which can
be fully accessible to the relevant industry members during the
process of creating that standard and therefore far easier to influence
than members of government. 181
Thus, in the context of the
government, "[t]he principal antitrust concern with regulatory
standards is that interested parties may be able to co-opt the
regulatory process to protect their market position against potential
competitors" 1 82 through a potentially disproportionate influence on the
legislative and regulatory process because of access to SSOs and to
large lobbying resources.
One infamous example of firms influencing government
regulation through SSOs is the case of Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v.
Indian Head, Inc., in which industry manufacturers actively recruited
new members to a private SSO in order to prevent the organization

178.

Id. These authors further observe that even though there are ways that

standards-setting activities can potentially raise antitrust concerns ... the legal basis
for intervention[] has rarely been articulated clearly. . . . Is the concern one of a
conspiratorial agreement under section 1 of the Sherman Act, or monopolization or
attempted monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman Act? If so, presumably the
challenger must establish the other elements of any such claims.

Id. at 1982-83 & n.219.
179.
Gerla, supra note 52, at 475.
Id.
180.
181.
Teece & Sherry, supra note 57, at 1918 ("For example, many local building codes
routinely adopt (as regulations) standards promulgated by otherwise-private SSOs such as the
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). The rationale for such delegation is that the SSO
has specialized expertise in the area . . . that local government bodies are likely to lack. But by
manipulating the actions of those SSOs, private parties can achieve an effect that would
otherwise require lobbying thousands of different city councils." (footnote omitted)).
Id.
182.
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from approving of the safety of a competing product (a behavior
referred to as "stuffing the ballot box"). 183
All the while, the
manufacturers knew that "a substantial number of state and local
governments" relied on the SSO to import verbatim standards into
public laws and regulations. 184 The industry thereby quelled rising
competition through an accessible private SSO and was sued for
antitrust liability.1 8 5
The Allied Tube defendants unsuccessfully
argued that such standard-setting behavior enjoyed immunity because
when governmental regulations enshrine the anticompetitive desires
of a certain industry, immunity rules provide the government with
However, governments are
protection from antitrust lawsuits.1 86
procedurally bound to only enact rules through processes requiring
minimum levels of transparency. 187
When it comes to private SSOs, perverse incentives can easily
manifest themselves in the certification process, invoking the image of
the proverbial fox guarding the chicken coop. 188 This moral hazard
manifests when individual firms unilaterally create certifications and
"green" labels for themselves or declare themselves to be producers of
Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 496-97 (1988); see
183.
Teece & Sherry, supra note 57, at 1918.
184.
Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 495, 498.
See id. at 492.
185.
186.
See id. at 495, 509-10 ("Petitioner contends that its efforts to affect the product
standard-setting process of a private association are immune from antitrust liability under the
Noerr doctrine primarily because the association's standards are widely adopted into law by
state and local governments. . . . Although we do not here set forth the rules of antitrust liability
governing the private standard-setting process, we hold that at least where, as here, an
economically interested party exercises decisionmaking authority in formulating a product
standard for a private association that comprises market participants, that party enjoys no Noerr
immunity from any antitrust liability flowing from the effect the standard has of its own force in
the marketplace. This conclusion does not deprive state and local governments of input and
information from interested individuals or organizations or leave petitioner with ample means to
petition those governments.").
See Teece & Sherry, supra note 57, at 1919; see also, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls.
187.
2-3 (establishing the US Constitution's bicameralism and presentment requirements for the
passage of federal legislation); Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554, §§ 551-59, 80
Stat. 378, 381-88 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (2012)) (establishing
requirements governing the creation and enforcement of regulations, such as public notice and
comment procedures).

See Rebecca Haw Allensworth, Foxes at the Henhouse: Occupational Licensing
188.
Boards Up Close, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1567, 1570 (2017) (studying the manifestation of such
perverse incentives in the context of occupational licensing through a "fifty-state, in-depth
survey" of 1,790 state occupational licensing boards, the results of which "may be disturbing to
those under the impression that occupational regulation is governmental, which is to say that it
is in any measure public or public-regarding" and finding that "[tihe dirty secret
behind occupational licensing boards is that very little of what they do resembles governmental
activity. .. . Thin or nonexistent supervision from the states means that the licensed sector of the
American workforce is almost entirely self-regulating.").
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"green" bioplastic. 189 It also arises when firms exert their market
power to create or maintain certain standards or certification systems.
For instance, "[a] firm with experience in solving a problem in a
particular way will, not surprisingly, favor standards that adopt that
familiar approach, as that will give that firm a comparative advantage
over other firms that have more experience in alternative solutions." 190
3. The Argument to Regulate a Uniform Blockchain Certification
System Sparingly
a. The General Corporate Context
Commentators advise that "to capture the social and economic
benefits made available through standards, antitrust authorities must
regulate sparingly." 19 1 There are also reasons for this restraint in
regulating a universal, blockchain-based certification system for
There are significant
determining compliance with standards.
procompetitive effects of the underlying standards that blockchain
could certify, as discussed above, and the effectiveness of those
standards could diminish if they are not effectively verified. 192 In
addition, strict enforcement of such a certification system may quell
innovation to improve said underlying standards as well as the
decentralized-ledger-based certification systems. 193 The FTC stated
that justifying anticompetitive collaborative behavior by pointing out
its environmental advantages would not be a "viable defense" for
anticompetitive behavior. 194 However, courts continue to discuss the

See supranotes 88-90 and accompanying text.
Teece & Sherry, supranote 57, at 1935.
Id. at 1913.
See discussion supra Part II.B.1; see also Sean P. Gates, Standards, Innovation, and

189.
190.
191.
192.

Antitrust: Integrating Innovation Concerns into the Analysis of Collaborative Standard Setting,

47 EMORY L.J. 583, 598 (1998) ("Among the procompetitive effects of standards, informational
standards often lower consumer transactional costs by quickly conveying design or other
information. By permitting ready comparison, informational standards may increase price
competition.").
See Teece & Sherry, supra note 57, at 1919; see also Gates, supra note 192, at 592
193.
(describing "the 'chilling effect' that the threat of antitrust litigation has on purportedly
procompetitive cooperative efforts").
in
the
on
Horizontal
Agreements
United
States,
Roundtable
194.
Environmental Context, TT
2,
12, 22 DAF/COMP/WD(2010)96
(Oct.
21, 2010),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/us-submissions-oecd-and-other-internationalcompetition-fora/1010horizontalagreements.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WRQ-WRQE] ("Arguing that
particular conduct benefits the environment is not a viable defense to conduct that is otherwise
illegal under antitrust laws. . . . It is highly unlikely that competitors could defend successfully a
Section

1

claim

on the

ground that their anticompetitive

agreement has environmental

benefits. . . . The task of balancing the public policy goals of competitive markets and
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potential role for noneconomic considerations-like public health and
safety-and broader societal welfare in a rule of reason analysis. 195
b. The PBC Context
Antitrust enforcement of a uniform, blockchain-based
certification system should especially be lenient in the context of
PBCs. Indeed, antitrust jurisprudence has already begun to allow for
a consideration of general social welfare when courts balance the
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of agreements made by
entities that do not belong to the traditional corporate context when
they are challenged under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 196 In United
States v. Brown University, the US Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit reversed the district court's determination, made under a
"quick look" rule of reason analysis, that Ivy League schools and other
schools violated the Sherman Act by agreeing to make collective
Pointing to
determinations concerning financial aid awards. 197
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, in which the Supreme Court
"counseled against applying traditional antitrust rules outside of
conventional business contexts," 1 98 the Third Circuit agreed with the
district court that the agreement was not per se unlawful because "as
a qualified charitable organization[,] . . . MIT deviates even further
prototype than do professional
from the profit-maximizing
1
99
The court determined that "the district court erred by
associations."
failing to adequately consider the procompetitive and social welfare
justifications proffered by MIT." 200 In holding that the case required a
full rule of reason analysis on remand, the court outlined criteria for
that analysis that included the social benefits of the agreement as
procompetitive effects with weight in the rule of reason balance. 20 1
The court described the promotion of "socioeconomic diversity" as an
improvement of the quality of the product or service; 202 the increased
preservation of the environment belongs to legislators, not courts or antitrust enforcers. Thus,
horizontal agreements relating to environmental objectives are treated the same as other
horizontal agreements for purposes of antitrust analysis.").
195.
Gerla, supra note 52, at 476-78 (collecting cases); see also discussion infra Part
II.B.3.b.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); see United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 661 (3d Cir.
196.
1993).
Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 661, 664.
197.
Id. at 670 (citing Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975)).
198.
Id. at 672. This observation could have important implications for potential future
199.
antitrust claims against PBCs.
200.
Id. at 661.
201.
Id. at 674.
Id. (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 114 (1984)).
202.
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financial aid for "needy students" as "[e]nhancement of consumer
choice"; 203 and financial aid, generally, as "eliminating price
competition [and] . . . channel[ing] competition into areas such as

curriculum, campus activities, and student-faculty interaction." 204
When it comes to standard setting, the problems that arise
from overregulation and the benefits that would result from lenient
enforcement would be amplified in the context of PBCs. If adopted by
other courts, the Brown University approach could help to establish a
lenient precedent to antitrust enforcement of collective action by PBCs
to create and subscribe to a uniform, blockchain-based certification
system. 20 5
If such standard-setting behavior was perceived as
collusive to an extent that would give rise to Sherman Act concerns, 206
courts might similarly consider PBCs uniformly using a blockchain
certification system to have an organizational purpose outside of the
normal realm of the business world. 207 In fact, the context of PBCs
provides even more compelling reasons for courts to do so than the
context of nonprofit entities such as universities. PBCs still have a
for-profit purpose, which is the area in which antitrust enforcement is
the most important, as one of the primary purposes of the Sherman
Act was to prevent businesses from colluding to fix prices. 208 The PBC
corporate form has the potential to attract more shareholder and
consumer dollars than a traditional corporate entity because it
espouses a mission that is socially and environmentally responsible. 209
Because profit-generation incentives remain, the anticompetitive
effects of allowing for different, ad hoc certification systems across the
PBC corporate landscape would likely outweigh the potential
procompetitive effects of strictly regulating a uniform certification
system with the aim of preventing firm collusion.
Uniform certification for corporations and PBCs pursuing a
public benefit provides significant procompetitive effects that may also
outweigh any anticompetitive effects with the social and
environmental welfare that they would create. 210
Even when
companies engage in good faith efforts to truthfully advertise that
they endeavor to engage in sustainable business practices, the
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. at 674-75 (citing NCAA, 468 U.S. at 102).
Id. at 675.
See id. at 658.
See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 492-93 (1988);

see also supra Part II.B.2.

207.
(1975)).
208.
209.
210.

See Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 670 (citing Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 778
See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223-24 (1940).
See discussion supra Part I.A.
See discussion supra Part II.B.
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underlying information about supply chains and production methods
still requires the effective calculation and corroboration that reliably
certified compliance to standards provides.
Standards and
certifications are valuable enough that they should withstand
antitrust scrutiny, especially in the PBC context, and blockchain
technology could provide transparency to such certification, which
could significantly mitigate the potential anticompetitive effects of
collusion-like agreement within industries to subscribe to certain
certifications and standards.
III. SOLUTION
Blockchain could become an important tool in creating or
socially
for modern,
streamlining standardized certification
responsible businesses. Implementing blockchain technology in the
certification process would provide both the comprehensiveness of
information and the flexibility to approach standards in an "inclusive"
way. 2 11 Blockchain could allow for low-cost, ex post adjustments to
standards, where needed, while preserving all the information
necessary to later enforce those standards. 2 12 Using blockchain in the
process of certification could mitigate the costs associated with
adjusting methods of measuring compliance to changing production
standards. 2 13 Blockchain would provide a thorough account of the
entire lifespan of a product as it moves through a supply chain and
would thereby serve as the backbone for measuring compliance to any
standard-new or old-with which the producer may wish or be
obliged to comply. 214 If the standard or certification system used by
groups, corporations, or PBCs faces a challenge under the Sherman
Act, the comprehensive information provided by blockchain technology
would contribute to antitrust enforcement by providing meaningful
information to a court's rule of reason analysis. This information
would be particularly helpful in the context of PBCs, which might be
scrutinized under the same analysis as the Ivy League schools in
Brown University.2 15
Some businesses have already floated the idea of using
blockchain technology to track products along their supply chainS 2 16 as
211.
See supranote 57 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 58-59 and accompanying text.
212.
213.
See supranotes 55-59 and accompanying text.
214.
See supraPart I.C.
215.
See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993).
216.
Roger Aitken, IBM Forges Blockchain Collaboration with Nestld & Walmart in
Global Food Safety, FORBES (Aug. 22, 2017, 9:15 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
rogeraitken/2017/08/22/ibm-forges-blockchain-collaboration-with-nestle-walmart-for-global-food-
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a method of addressing the problems of data availability and
reliability that occur in any scenario involving product ratings and
reviews, such as in the case of GoodGuide described above. For
example, a company called Provenance incorporates blockchain into
its methodology to increase reliability in reviewing products. 217
Provenance tracks product supply chains to monitor any given type of
concern that might arise in goods production, 218 such as to track
slavery in the fish market. 219 The company completed a successful
trial of this system, 220 by which local companies in source areas for the
safety/#1467d4c73d36 [https://perma.cc/CS75-ZQKW] ("A group of leading retailers and food
companies including Nestl6 and Walmart have signalled their commitment to 'strengthen
consumer confidence' in the foods they purchase by announcing a major blockchain collaboration
with IBM. . . . Given that today nobody currently oversees the entire supply chain and
traceability is undertaken only in a linear fashion, this is where the blockchain is being pitched
as playing a pivotal role."); Michael J. Casey & Pindar Wong, Global Supply Chains Are About to
Get
Better,
Thanks
to
Blockchain,
HARv.
Bus.
REV.
(Mar.
13,
2017),
https://hbr.org/2017/03/global-supply-chains-are-about-to-get-better-thanks-to-blockchain
[https://perma.cc/5HDJ-B9C3] ("In a nutshell, this is a global system for mediating trust and
selective transparency.").
217.
PROVENANCE, https://www.provenance.org/ [https://perma.cc/JAX3-4Z38] (last visited
Jan. 2, 2018); see PROVENANCE, BLOCKCHAIN: THE SOLUTION FOR TRANSPARENCY IN PRODUCT
SUPPLY
CHAINS
(2015)
[hereinafter
PROVENANCE
WHITEPAPER],

https://www.provenance.org/whitepaper [https://perma.cclNL2M-ADWN] ("Using blockchains as
a shared and secure platform . . . overcome[s] the weaknesses of current systems by allowing one
to securely audit all transactions that brought this state of being into effect; i.e., to inspect the
uninterruptedchain of custody from the raw materials to the end sale. The blockchain also gives
us an unprecedented level of certainty over the fidelity of the information. We can be sure that
all transfers of ownership were explicitly authorized by their relevant controllers without having
to trust the behavior or competence of an incumbent processor. Interested parties may also audit
the production and manufacturing avatars and verify that their 'on-chain' persona accurately

reflects reality." (emphasis in original)); see also The Provenance Team, How Provenance Uses
Blockchain to Digitise Certification, PROVENANCE (July 25, 2017), https://www.provenance.org/
news/technology/blockchain-certification [https://perma.cclY2AX-B7V6].
218.

PROVENANCE

WHITEPAPER,

supra note

217

("[Provenance]

uses

blockchain

technology to enable secure traceability of certifications and other salient information in supply
chains. Provenance enables every physical product to come with a digital 'passport' that proves
authenticity . . . and origin . ..

creating an auditable record of the journey behind all physical

products."); see also Luke Parker, Provenance to Restore Consumer Trust with the Blockchain,
BRAVE NEW COIN (Dec. 5, 2015)
[hereinafter Parker, Restore Consumer Trust],
http://bravenewcoin.com/news/provenance-to-restore-consumer-trust-with-the-blockchain/
[https://perma.cclRT4Q-XK87].
219.
See Luke Parker, Provenance Tackles Slavery in the Fish Trade, with Blockchain
Technology, BRAVE NEW COIN (Sept. 16, 2016) [hereinafter Parker, Slavery in the Fish Trade],
http://bravenewcoin.com/news/provenance-tackles-slavery-in-the-fish-trade-with-blockchaintechnology/ [https://perma.cc/7FDH-YU6Q]; see also Tom Levitt, Blockchain Technology Trialled
to Tackle Slavery in the Fishing Industry, GUARDIAN (Sept. 7, 2016, 2:30 AM),
https://www.theguardian.comsustainable-business/2016/sep/07/blockchain-fish-slavery-freeseafood-sustainable-technology [https://perma.cc/F94Y-KKWQ].
220.

PROVENANCE, FROM SHORE TO PLATE: TRACKING TUNA ON THE BLOCKCHAIN (2016),

https://www.provenance.org/tracking-tuna-on-the-blockchain

[https://perma.ccfLHA2-9HTN].
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fish trade would add their day's catch to a public blockchain via text
"The catch, processing, accreditation, packaging,
message. 22 1
shipping, and shelving of every filet's history can then be recorded
online for the world to scrutinize." 2 2 2 The system works partially
because, according to a United Nations Environmental Program
(UNEP) report, "[m]ost sustainability issues[,] such as ill-adapted
governance and institutions, . . . bad working conditions, lack of price
transparency and information sharing[,] . . . are concentrated at the

level of production and first intermediaries/processors." 223 Provenance
already works with a number of companies, including the British
supermarket Co-op 22 4 and a number of certifiers, including Fairtrade
International. 2 2 5 A new collaboration "to test whether blockchain
technology can help unlock financial incentives that improve
transparency and sustainability in supply chains" involves other
fintech startups, large companies like Unilever and Sainsbury's, and
Previous
global banks like Barclays and BNP Parisbas. 226
implementations of blockchain technology only involved specialized
services, such as Everledger, which tracks the production of
diamonds, 227 and Ascribe, which tracks digital artwork. 228 In contrast,

Parker, Slavery in the Fish Trade, supra note 219.
Id.

221.
222.
223.
THE

UNITED NATIONS ENV'T PROGRAMME, THE ROLE OF SUPPLY CHAINS IN ADDRESSING
http://unep.ch/etb/publications/
7
(2009),
CRISIS
GLOBAL
SEAFOOD

Fish%20Supply%2OChains/UNEP%20fish%20supply%2Ochains%20report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8TBE-J5TG].
The Provenance Team, Unlocking the Financial Incentives That Reward
224.
12,
2017),
(Dec.
PROVENANCE
Chains,
in
Supply
Sustainability
[https://perma.cc/7BG8-4CXK]; see also Cathryn
https://www.provenance.org/news/us/3899
2016),
15,
(Sept.
Alpha,
co-op
Provenance
Higgs,
https://digitalblog.coop.co.uk/2016/09/15/provenance-alpha/ [https://perma.cc/4B99-RFGB].
Thibaut Schaeffer, Blockchain FAQs for Certifiers, Auditors and Assurance
225.
Organisations, PROVENANCE

(Oct.

10,

2017),

https://www.provenance.org/news/technology/

blockchain-faqs-certifiers-auditors-assurance-organisations [https://perma.cc/6T56-JCQX].
226.
The Provenance Team, supra note 224; see also Thomas Verhagen, Blue Chips and
Startups Launch New Fintech Pilot for More Sustainable Supply Chains at the One Planet
12,
(Dec.
LEADERSHIP
INST.
FOR
SUSTAINABILITY
CAMBRIDGE
Summit,
https://www.cisl.cam.ac.uk/business-action/sustainable-finance/banking-environment-

2017),

initiative/news/blue-chips-and-startups-launch-new-fintech-pilot [https://perma.cclR72E-5WV7].
227.
Luke Parker, Everledger Uses the Blockchain, Tackling Conflict Diamonds and
Insurance

Fraud,

BRAVE

NEW

COIN

(July

8,

2015),

http://bravenewcoin.com/news/

everledger-uses-the-blockchain-tackling-conflict-diamonds-and-insurance-fraud/
https://www.everledger.io/
see
also
EVERLEDGER,
[https://perma.cclGH8A-8EPV];
[https://perma.cc/XZ7S-49GR] (last visited Jan. 2, 2018); Parker, Restore Consumer Trust, supra
use the blockchain to track single
note 218 ("[A] few specialized services like Everledger ...
product types, in their [case] of diamonds.").
228.
Luke Parker, Ascribe Wants to Build 'The Ownership Layer of the Internet', BRAVE
NEW COIN (June 5, 2015), http://bravenewcoin.com/news/ascribe-wants-to-build-the-ownership-
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the value of Provenance lies in its versatility in tracking "any type of
product, throughout every part of its lifecycle." 229
Hurdles remain for mainstream adoption of blockchain, and
they are not necessarily technological. 2 30 Some of the most daunting
remaining challenges involve "politics, regulatory approval, and the
many thousands of hours of custom software design and front and
back-end programming still required to link up the new blockchain
ledgers to current business networks. "231 Lawyers, businesspeople,
and regulators need to address these and other issues in order to
realize blockchain implementation. 232
Despite certain obstacles, blockchain technology remains a
promising tool for future certification systems and could be
particularly important in the PBC context. PBC corporate doctrine
requires that companies pursue some public benefit by keeping the
interests of stakeholders other than shareholders in mind but does not
necessarily require a third party to verify the company's adoption of
socially and environmentally responsible practices. 233
Therefore,
for social
certification
that PBCs meet baseline standards
responsibility in those processes will become increasingly important,
not only for ensuring corporate compliance with basic government
regulations or a third-party certification system but also for
determining that PBCs deliver the public benefit promised in their
articles of incorporation.
While uniform behavior across an industry or market may
raise antitrust concerns, it also has the potential to vitally contribute
to healthy competition. PBCs' ability to set ad hoc sustainability
standards for themselves may be more harmful and involve even
greater anticompetitive aspects than for typical corporations. This is
because the market for PBCs, both in investor shares and consumer

layer-of-the-internet/ [https://perma.cc/RY52-YKYK]; see also ASCRIBE, https://www.ascribe.io/
[https://perma.cclYLG5-NBSM] (last visited Jan. 2, 2018); Parker, Restore Consumer Trust,
Ascribe use the blockchain to track single
supra note 218 ("[A] few specialized services like ...
product types, in their [case] of . .. digital artwork.").
229.

Parker, Restore Consumer Trust, supra note 218.

230.
See Garret/Galland Research, Can Blockchain Become the Gold Standard?,
INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 10, 2016, 3:49 AM), http://www.investopedia.com/stock-analysis/111016/canblockchain-become-global-standard.aspx [https://perma.cc/NW2H-CM59].
231.
Id.
232.
For blockchain to become mainstream, according to Garret/Galland Research,
additional changes must take place: "DLT [distributed ledger technology] must interface with
other parts of the operational processes seamlessly. . . . Security also remains a concern. . ..
Banks are not interested in an open-source model for identity. . . . Regulation is also critical in
creating an open digital environment for commerce and financial transactions." Id.
233.
See supra notes 36-37, 44-47 and accompanying text.
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demand for products, could be driven by PBCs' ability to meet those
exact standards. 234
IV. CONCLUsIoN

Fostering a competitive market for sustainable products and
services from both traditional corporations and PBCs will require
developing certification systems that involve the transparency,
verifiability, accountability, and accessibility that can be supplied
through blockchains. This market may become quite significant. The
popularity of PBCs is rising, and even companies that continue to
incorporate in the traditional profit-maximizing manner are facing
pressure from consumers to engage in a more prosocial,
proenvironmental manner along their supply chains. High-profile
cases such as the VW scandal are likely further incentivizing
traditional corporations to find ways to verify the sustainability of
their business practices. This pressure may also bring PBCs even
more into the mainstream.
In this business environment, transparent tracking of
production processes in order to reliably evaluate a company's
compliance with environmental and social responsibility standards
Widespread adoption of
plays an increasingly crucial role.
such
provide
would
systems
certification
blockchain-based
transparency and reliability, thereby mitigating the market failures
that arise in the modern, high-transaction-cost business environment.
A regulatory crackdown on such a system would be counterproductive
in mitigating the market failures that antitrust doctrine itself aims to
combat.
MargaretD. Fowler*

234.
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e.g.,

Why
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Benefit
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CORP.,

&

(last
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